Darf man in einem Notfall schneller fahren als die Polizei erlaubt?

This question cannot be answered in a flat-rate manner with a “yes” or with a “no”, the individual case always decides legally.

Theoretically, in any case, an appeal for “justifying emergency status” could be considered in accordance with §34 Criminal Code (StGB) or according to §16 Ordinary Disorders Act (OwiG). The text of the law reads: “Whoever commits an act in a present, unrestricted danger to life, body, freedom, honour, property or any other legal material in order to avoid the danger of himself or another does not act illegally if, in the event of a balancing of the conflicting interests, namely the legal goods concerned and the degree of dangers threatening them, the protected interest substantially outweighs the affected person. However, this applies only to the extent that the act is an appropriate means of avoiding the danger”.

In detail, this means:

1. The danger must be present,

2.) The risk must not be reusable in any other way than by the desire of the emergency action, so it must not be a less engaging means which is equally well available for the risk. In this respect, strict standards must be laid down,

3. In the context of the balancing of legal goods to be carried out, the protected interest must significantly override the person concerned and

4. The act must be a “appropriate means” for eliminating the danger.

Road traffic regulations have been adopted in principle for the prevention of danger or for the protection of the body and life of road users. Those who do not comply with these regulations have an increased risk of accidents and, of course, jeopardise unparticipated third parties. In the balance of legal goods, therefore, the life and life of the other road users and the body of the pregnant and unborn child are at first confronted, so there are two fundamentally equivalent legal goods which stand opposite each other and there is no “essential overthrow”. In such a case that two fundamentally equivalent legal goods are present, however, the degree of danger of §34 StGB or §16 OwiG comes to bear. The danger of accident is legally a so-called “abstract danger”, because it is not certain that an accident is caused by the exceeding of the permissible maximum speed. However, it is ensured that the pregnant woman and/or the unborn child will suffer a health damage if they do not receive medical assistance as soon as possible, so there is a “concrete danger”. This has the effect of shifting the balance of legal goods in favour of the more acute, i.e. the more concrete danger. However, at no time must there be a concrete risk to other road users, because then there is a concrete risk of concrete danger and any justification fails.

In practice, however, it will most likely fail in the appropriateness of the emergency action. It is not appropriate to exceed the permissible maximum speed with the private vehicle if there is a rescue service which, in 95% of all emergency cases, must be at the emergency site within ten minutes (nationally differently regulated but in no federal state for more than 15 minutes). Something else can be given in individual cases when the dispatcher in the emergency call office says that it can take 30, 40 minutes until an ambulance arrives. This is possible in absolute exceptional cases. I call here an example because it is currently the heavy train accident in Bavaria. Here, all the rescue equipment available in the area were naturally tied to the train accident and it can take quite a long time until an ambulance reaches the pregnant woman. In such a case, however, it may be possible to also justify police competence, i.e. instead of the rescue service, the police may come and drive the pregnant woman with blue light and sequel to the hospital.

Mf